Files
runc/libcontainer/seccomp/patchbpf/enosys_linux_test.go
Aleksa Sarai be6488a5a9 seccomp: enosys: always return -ENOSYS for setup(2) on s390(x)
On s390x, syscalls above 255 are multiplexed using the (now otherwise
unused) setup(2) syscall (syscall number 0). If the kernel supports the
syscall then it will correctly translate the syscall number such that
seccomp will correctly detect it -- however, for unknown syscalls the
syscall number remains unchanged. This can be verified by running the
following program under strace:

	int main(void)
	{
		scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_TRAP);
		seccomp_load(ctx);

		return syscall(439, AT_FDCWD, "asdf", X_OK, 0);
	}

Which will then die with the following signal (on pre-5.8 kernels):

	--- SIGSYS {si_signo=SIGSYS, si_code=SYS_SECCOMP,
	            si_call_addr=0x3ffb3006c22, si_syscall=__NR_setup,
	            si_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X} ---

(Note that the si_syscall is __NR_setup, not __NR_faccessat2.)

As a result, the -ENOSYS handling we had previously did not work
completely correctly on s390x because any syscall not supported by the
kernel would be treated as syscall number 0 rather than the actual
syscall number.

Always returning -ENOSYS will not cause any issues because in all of the
cases where this multiplexing occurs, seccomp will see the remapped
syscall number -- and no userspace program will call setup(2)
intentionally (the syscall has not existed in Linux for decades and was
originally a hack used early in Linux init prior to spawning pid1 -- so
you will get -ENOSYS from the kernel anyway).

Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
2022-05-23 16:36:07 +10:00

310 lines
8.1 KiB
Go

//go:build cgo && seccomp
// +build cgo,seccomp
package patchbpf
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs"
libseccomp "github.com/seccomp/libseccomp-golang"
"golang.org/x/net/bpf"
)
type seccompData struct {
Syscall uint32 // NOTE: We assume sizeof(int) == 4.
Arch uint32
IP uint64
Args [6]uint64
}
// mockSyscallPayload creates a fake seccomp_data struct with the given data.
func mockSyscallPayload(t *testing.T, sysno libseccomp.ScmpSyscall, arch nativeArch, args ...uint64) []byte {
var buf bytes.Buffer
data := seccompData{
Syscall: uint32(sysno),
Arch: uint32(arch),
IP: 0xDEADBEEFCAFE,
}
copy(data.Args[:], args)
if len(args) > 6 {
t.Fatalf("bad syscall payload: linux only supports 6-argument syscalls")
}
// NOTE: We use BigEndian here because golang.org/x/net/bpf assumes that
// all payloads are big-endian while seccomp uses host endianness.
if err := binary.Write(&buf, binary.BigEndian, data); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("bad syscall payload: cannot write data: %v", err)
}
return buf.Bytes()
}
// retFallthrough is returned by the mockFilter. If a the mock filter returns
// this value, it indicates "fallthrough to libseccomp-generated filter".
const retFallthrough uint32 = 0xDEADBEEF
// mockFilter returns a BPF VM that contains a mock filter with an -ENOSYS
// stub. If the filter returns retFallthrough, the stub filter has permitted
// the syscall to pass.
func mockFilter(t *testing.T, config *configs.Seccomp) (*bpf.VM, []bpf.Instruction) {
patch, err := generatePatch(config)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mock filter: generate enosys patch: %v", err)
}
program := append(patch, bpf.RetConstant{Val: retFallthrough})
vm, err := bpf.NewVM(program)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mock filter: compile BPF VM: %v", err)
}
return vm, program
}
// fakeConfig generates a fake libcontainer seccomp configuration. The syscalls
// are added with an action distinct from the default action.
func fakeConfig(defaultAction configs.Action, explicitSyscalls []string, arches []string) *configs.Seccomp {
config := configs.Seccomp{
DefaultAction: defaultAction,
Architectures: arches,
}
syscallAction := configs.Allow
if syscallAction == defaultAction {
syscallAction = configs.Kill
}
for _, syscall := range explicitSyscalls {
config.Syscalls = append(config.Syscalls, &configs.Syscall{
Name: syscall,
Action: syscallAction,
})
}
return &config
}
// List copied from <libcontainer/seccomp/config.go>.
var testArches = []string{
"x86",
"amd64",
"x32",
"arm",
"arm64",
"mips",
"mips64",
"mips64n32",
"mipsel",
"mipsel64",
"mipsel64n32",
"ppc",
"ppc64",
"ppc64le",
"s390",
"s390x",
}
func testEnosysStub(t *testing.T, defaultAction configs.Action, arches []string) {
explicitSyscalls := []string{
"setns",
"kcmp",
"renameat2",
"copy_file_range",
}
implicitSyscalls := []string{
"clone",
"openat",
"read",
"write",
}
futureSyscalls := []libseccomp.ScmpSyscall{1000, 7331}
// Quick lookups for which arches are enabled.
archSet := map[string]bool{}
for _, arch := range arches {
archSet[arch] = true
}
for _, test := range []struct {
start, end int
}{
{0, 1}, // [setns]
{0, 2}, // [setns, process_vm_readv]
{1, 2}, // [process_vm_readv]
{1, 3}, // [process_vm_readv, renameat2, copy_file_range]
{1, 4}, // [process_vm_readv, renameat2, copy_file_range]
{3, 4}, // [copy_file_range]
} {
allowedSyscalls := explicitSyscalls[test.start:test.end]
config := fakeConfig(defaultAction, allowedSyscalls, arches)
filter, program := mockFilter(t, config)
// The syscalls are in increasing order of newness, so all syscalls
// after the last allowed syscall will give -ENOSYS.
enosysStart := test.end
for _, arch := range testArches {
type syscallTest struct {
syscall string
sysno libseccomp.ScmpSyscall
expected uint32
}
scmpArch, err := libseccomp.GetArchFromString(arch)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unknown libseccomp architecture %q: %v", arch, err)
}
nativeArch, err := archToNative(scmpArch)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unknown audit architecture %q: %v", arch, err)
}
var syscallTests []syscallTest
// Add explicit syscalls (whether they will return -ENOSYS
// depends on the filter rules).
for idx, syscall := range explicitSyscalls {
expected := retFallthrough
if idx >= enosysStart {
expected = retErrnoEnosys
}
sysno, err := libseccomp.GetSyscallFromNameByArch(syscall, scmpArch)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unknown syscall %q on arch %q: %v", syscall, arch, err)
}
syscallTests = append(syscallTests, syscallTest{
syscall,
sysno,
expected,
})
}
// Add implicit syscalls.
for _, syscall := range implicitSyscalls {
sysno, err := libseccomp.GetSyscallFromNameByArch(syscall, scmpArch)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unknown syscall %q on arch %q: %v", syscall, arch, err)
}
syscallTests = append(syscallTests, syscallTest{
sysno: sysno,
syscall: syscall,
expected: retFallthrough,
})
}
// Add future syscalls.
for _, sysno := range futureSyscalls {
baseSysno, err := libseccomp.GetSyscallFromNameByArch("copy_file_range", scmpArch)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unknown syscall 'copy_file_range' on arch %q: %v", arch, err)
}
sysno += baseSysno
syscallTests = append(syscallTests, syscallTest{
sysno: sysno,
syscall: fmt.Sprintf("syscall_%#x", sysno),
expected: retErrnoEnosys,
})
}
// If we're on s390(x) make sure you get -ENOSYS for the "setup"
// syscall (this is done to work around an issue with s390x's
// syscall multiplexing which results in unknown syscalls being a
// setup(2) invocation).
switch scmpArch {
case libseccomp.ArchS390, libseccomp.ArchS390X:
syscallTests = append(syscallTests, syscallTest{
sysno: s390xMultiplexSyscall,
syscall: "setup",
expected: retErrnoEnosys,
})
}
// Test syscalls in the explicit list.
for _, test := range syscallTests {
// Override the expected value in the two special cases.
if !archSet[arch] || isAllowAction(defaultAction) {
test.expected = retFallthrough
}
payload := mockSyscallPayload(t, test.sysno, nativeArch, 0x1337, 0xF00BA5)
// NOTE: golang.org/x/net/bpf returns int here rather
// than uint32.
rawRet, err := filter.Run(payload)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("error running filter: %v", err)
}
ret := uint32(rawRet)
if ret != test.expected {
t.Logf("mock filter for %v %v:", arches, allowedSyscalls)
for idx, insn := range program {
t.Logf(" [%4.1d] %s", idx, insn)
}
t.Logf("payload: %#v", payload)
t.Errorf("filter %s(%d) %q(%d): got %#x, want %#x", arch, nativeArch, test.syscall, test.sysno, ret, test.expected)
}
}
}
}
}
var testActions = map[string]configs.Action{
"allow": configs.Allow,
"log": configs.Log,
"errno": configs.Errno,
"kill": configs.Kill,
}
func TestEnosysStub_SingleArch(t *testing.T) {
for _, arch := range testArches {
arches := []string{arch}
t.Run("arch="+arch, func(t *testing.T) {
for name, action := range testActions {
t.Run("action="+name, func(t *testing.T) {
testEnosysStub(t, action, arches)
})
}
})
}
}
func TestEnosysStub_MultiArch(t *testing.T) {
for end := 0; end < len(testArches); end++ {
for start := 0; start < end; start++ {
arches := testArches[start:end]
if len(arches) <= 1 {
continue
}
for _, action := range testActions {
testEnosysStub(t, action, arches)
}
}
}
}
func TestDisassembleHugeFilterDoesNotHang(t *testing.T) {
hugeFilter, err := libseccomp.NewFilter(libseccomp.ActAllow)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create seccomp filter: %v", err)
}
for i := 1; i < 10000; i++ {
if err := hugeFilter.AddRule(libseccomp.ScmpSyscall(i), libseccomp.ActKillThread); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to add rule to filter %d: %v", i, err)
}
}
_, err = disassembleFilter(hugeFilter)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to disassembleFilter: %v", err)
}
// if we exit, we did not hang
}