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Set the process personality early to ensure it takes effect before seccomp is initialized. If seccomp filters are applied first and they block personality-related system calls (e.g., `personality(2)`), subsequent attempts to set the personality will fail. Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
165 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
165 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
package libcontainer
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"github.com/opencontainers/selinux/go-selinux"
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"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
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"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
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"github.com/opencontainers/runc/internal/linux"
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"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/apparmor"
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"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/keys"
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"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/seccomp"
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"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/system"
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"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils"
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)
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// linuxSetnsInit performs the container's initialization for running a new process
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// inside an existing container.
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type linuxSetnsInit struct {
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pipe *syncSocket
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consoleSocket *os.File
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pidfdSocket *os.File
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config *initConfig
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logPipe *os.File
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}
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func (l *linuxSetnsInit) getSessionRingName() string {
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return "_ses." + l.config.ContainerID
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}
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func (l *linuxSetnsInit) Init() error {
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if !l.config.Config.NoNewKeyring {
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if l.config.ProcessLabel != "" {
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if err := selinux.SetKeyLabel(l.config.ProcessLabel); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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defer selinux.SetKeyLabel("") //nolint: errcheck
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}
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// Do not inherit the parent's session keyring.
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if _, err := keys.JoinSessionKeyring(l.getSessionRingName()); err != nil {
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logrus.Warnf("KeyctlJoinSessionKeyring: %v", err)
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// Same justification as in standard_init_linux.go as to why we
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// don't bail on ENOSYS.
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if !errors.Is(err, unix.ENOSYS) {
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to join session keyring: %w", err)
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}
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}
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}
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if l.config.CreateConsole {
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if err := setupConsole(l.consoleSocket, l.config, false); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := system.Setctty(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if l.pidfdSocket != nil {
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if err := setupPidfd(l.pidfdSocket, "setns"); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to setup pidfd: %w", err)
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}
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}
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if l.config.NoNewPrivileges {
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if err := unix.Prctl(unix.PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if l.config.Config.Umask != nil {
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unix.Umask(int(*l.config.Config.Umask))
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}
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if err := setupScheduler(l.config); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := setupIOPriority(l.config); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Set personality if specified.
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if l.config.Config.Personality != nil {
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if err := setupPersonality(l.config.Config); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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// Tell our parent that we're ready to exec. This must be done before the
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// Seccomp rules have been applied, because we need to be able to read and
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// write to a socket.
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if err := syncParentReady(l.pipe); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("sync ready: %w", err)
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}
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if l.config.ProcessLabel != "" {
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if err := selinux.SetExecLabel(l.config.ProcessLabel); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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defer selinux.SetExecLabel("") //nolint: errcheck
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}
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// Without NoNewPrivileges seccomp is a privileged operation, so we need to
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// do this before dropping capabilities; otherwise do it as late as possible
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// just before execve so as few syscalls take place after it as possible.
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if l.config.Config.Seccomp != nil && !l.config.NoNewPrivileges {
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seccompFd, err := seccomp.InitSeccomp(l.config.Config.Seccomp)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := syncParentSeccomp(l.pipe, seccompFd); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if err := finalizeNamespace(l.config); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := apparmor.ApplyProfile(l.config.AppArmorProfile); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Check for the arg early to make sure it exists.
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name, err := exec.LookPath(l.config.Args[0])
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Set seccomp as close to execve as possible, so as few syscalls take
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// place afterward (reducing the amount of syscalls that users need to
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// enable in their seccomp profiles).
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if l.config.Config.Seccomp != nil && l.config.NoNewPrivileges {
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seccompFd, err := seccomp.InitSeccomp(l.config.Config.Seccomp)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("unable to init seccomp: %w", err)
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}
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if err := syncParentSeccomp(l.pipe, seccompFd); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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// Close the pipe to signal that we have completed our init.
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// Please keep this because we don't want to get a pipe write error if
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// there is an error from `execve` after all fds closed.
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_ = l.pipe.Close()
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// Close the log pipe fd so the parent's ForwardLogs can exit.
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logrus.Debugf("setns_init: about to exec")
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if err := l.logPipe.Close(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("close log pipe: %w", err)
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}
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// Close all file descriptors we are not passing to the container. This is
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// necessary because the execve target could use internal runc fds as the
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// execve path, potentially giving access to binary files from the host
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// (which can then be opened by container processes, leading to container
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// escapes). Note that because this operation will close any open file
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// descriptors that are referenced by (*os.File) handles from underneath
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// the Go runtime, we must not do any file operations after this point
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// (otherwise the (*os.File) finaliser could close the wrong file). See
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// CVE-2024-21626 for more information as to why this protection is
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// necessary.
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if err := utils.UnsafeCloseFrom(l.config.PassedFilesCount + 3); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return linux.Exec(name, l.config.Args, l.config.Env)
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}
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