Files
runc/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
Aleksa Sarai 0ca91f44f1 rootfs: add mount destination validation
Because the target of a mount is inside a container (which may be a
volume that is shared with another container), there exists a race
condition where the target of the mount may change to a path containing
a symlink after we have sanitised the path -- resulting in us
inadvertently mounting the path outside of the container.

This is not immediately useful because we are in a mount namespace with
MS_SLAVE mount propagation applied to "/", so we cannot mount on top of
host paths in the host namespace. However, if any subsequent mountpoints
in the configuration use a subdirectory of that host path as a source,
those subsequent mounts will use an attacker-controlled source path
(resolved within the host rootfs) -- allowing the bind-mounting of "/"
into the container.

While arguably configuration issues like this are not entirely within
runc's threat model, within the context of Kubernetes (and possibly
other container managers that provide semi-arbitrary container creation
privileges to untrusted users) this is a legitimate issue. Since we
cannot block mounting from the host into the container, we need to block
the first stage of this attack (mounting onto a path outside the
container).

The long-term plan to solve this would be to migrate to libpathrs, but
as a stop-gap we implement libpathrs-like path verification through
readlink(/proc/self/fd/$n) and then do mount operations through the
procfd once it's been verified to be inside the container. The target
could move after we've checked it, but if it is inside the container
then we can assume that it is safe for the same reason that libpathrs
operations would be safe.

A slight wrinkle is the "copyup" functionality we provide for tmpfs,
which is the only case where we want to do a mount on the host
filesystem. To facilitate this, I split out the copy-up functionality
entirely so that the logic isn't interspersed with the regular tmpfs
logic. In addition, all dependencies on m.Destination being overwritten
have been removed since that pattern was just begging to be a source of
more mount-target bugs (we do still have to modify m.Destination for
tmpfs-copyup but we only do it temporarily).

Fixes: CVE-2021-30465
Reported-by: Etienne Champetier <champetier.etienne@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Noah Meyerhans <nmeyerha@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Karp <skarp@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com> (@kolyshkin)
Reviewed-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
2021-05-19 16:58:35 +10:00

1082 lines
32 KiB
Go

// +build linux
package libcontainer
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
securejoin "github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin"
"github.com/moby/sys/mountinfo"
"github.com/mrunalp/fileutils"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/cgroups"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/cgroups/fs2"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/devices"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/userns"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils"
libcontainerUtils "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils"
"github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/specs-go"
"github.com/opencontainers/selinux/go-selinux/label"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
const defaultMountFlags = unix.MS_NOEXEC | unix.MS_NOSUID | unix.MS_NODEV
type mountConfig struct {
root string
label string
cgroup2Path string
rootlessCgroups bool
cgroupns bool
}
// needsSetupDev returns true if /dev needs to be set up.
func needsSetupDev(config *configs.Config) bool {
for _, m := range config.Mounts {
if m.Device == "bind" && libcontainerUtils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// prepareRootfs sets up the devices, mount points, and filesystems for use
// inside a new mount namespace. It doesn't set anything as ro. You must call
// finalizeRootfs after this function to finish setting up the rootfs.
func prepareRootfs(pipe io.ReadWriter, iConfig *initConfig) (err error) {
config := iConfig.Config
if err := prepareRoot(config); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "preparing rootfs")
}
mountConfig := &mountConfig{
root: config.Rootfs,
label: config.MountLabel,
cgroup2Path: iConfig.Cgroup2Path,
rootlessCgroups: iConfig.RootlessCgroups,
cgroupns: config.Namespaces.Contains(configs.NEWCGROUP),
}
setupDev := needsSetupDev(config)
for _, m := range config.Mounts {
for _, precmd := range m.PremountCmds {
if err := mountCmd(precmd); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "running premount command")
}
}
if err := mountToRootfs(m, mountConfig); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err, "mounting %q to rootfs at %q", m.Source, m.Destination)
}
for _, postcmd := range m.PostmountCmds {
if err := mountCmd(postcmd); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "running postmount command")
}
}
}
if setupDev {
if err := createDevices(config); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "creating device nodes")
}
if err := setupPtmx(config); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "setting up ptmx")
}
if err := setupDevSymlinks(config.Rootfs); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "setting up /dev symlinks")
}
}
// Signal the parent to run the pre-start hooks.
// The hooks are run after the mounts are setup, but before we switch to the new
// root, so that the old root is still available in the hooks for any mount
// manipulations.
// Note that iConfig.Cwd is not guaranteed to exist here.
if err := syncParentHooks(pipe); err != nil {
return err
}
// The reason these operations are done here rather than in finalizeRootfs
// is because the console-handling code gets quite sticky if we have to set
// up the console before doing the pivot_root(2). This is because the
// Console API has to also work with the ExecIn case, which means that the
// API must be able to deal with being inside as well as outside the
// container. It's just cleaner to do this here (at the expense of the
// operation not being perfectly split).
if err := unix.Chdir(config.Rootfs); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err, "changing dir to %q", config.Rootfs)
}
s := iConfig.SpecState
s.Pid = unix.Getpid()
s.Status = specs.StateCreating
if err := iConfig.Config.Hooks[configs.CreateContainer].RunHooks(s); err != nil {
return err
}
if config.NoPivotRoot {
err = msMoveRoot(config.Rootfs)
} else if config.Namespaces.Contains(configs.NEWNS) {
err = pivotRoot(config.Rootfs)
} else {
err = chroot()
}
if err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "jailing process inside rootfs")
}
if setupDev {
if err := reOpenDevNull(); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "reopening /dev/null inside container")
}
}
if cwd := iConfig.Cwd; cwd != "" {
// Note that spec.Process.Cwd can contain unclean value like "../../../../foo/bar...".
// However, we are safe to call MkDirAll directly because we are in the jail here.
if err := os.MkdirAll(cwd, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// finalizeRootfs sets anything to ro if necessary. You must call
// prepareRootfs first.
func finalizeRootfs(config *configs.Config) (err error) {
// remount dev as ro if specified
for _, m := range config.Mounts {
if libcontainerUtils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
if m.Flags&unix.MS_RDONLY == unix.MS_RDONLY {
if err := remountReadonly(m); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err, "remounting %q as readonly", m.Destination)
}
}
break
}
}
// set rootfs ( / ) as readonly
if config.Readonlyfs {
if err := setReadonly(); err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "setting rootfs as readonly")
}
}
if config.Umask != nil {
unix.Umask(int(*config.Umask))
} else {
unix.Umask(0022)
}
return nil
}
// /tmp has to be mounted as private to allow MS_MOVE to work in all situations
func prepareTmp(topTmpDir string) (string, error) {
tmpdir, err := ioutil.TempDir(topTmpDir, "runctop")
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if err := unix.Mount(tmpdir, tmpdir, "bind", unix.MS_BIND, ""); err != nil {
return "", err
}
if err := unix.Mount("", tmpdir, "", uintptr(unix.MS_PRIVATE), ""); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return tmpdir, nil
}
func cleanupTmp(tmpdir string) error {
unix.Unmount(tmpdir, 0)
return os.RemoveAll(tmpdir)
}
func mountCmd(cmd configs.Command) error {
command := exec.Command(cmd.Path, cmd.Args[:]...)
command.Env = cmd.Env
command.Dir = cmd.Dir
if out, err := command.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%#v failed: %s: %v", cmd, string(out), err)
}
return nil
}
func prepareBindMount(m *configs.Mount, rootfs string) error {
stat, err := os.Stat(m.Source)
if err != nil {
// error out if the source of a bind mount does not exist as we will be
// unable to bind anything to it.
return err
}
// ensure that the destination of the bind mount is resolved of symlinks at mount time because
// any previous mounts can invalidate the next mount's destination.
// this can happen when a user specifies mounts within other mounts to cause breakouts or other
// evil stuff to try to escape the container's rootfs.
var dest string
if dest, err = securejoin.SecureJoin(rootfs, m.Destination); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := checkProcMount(rootfs, dest, m.Source); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := createIfNotExists(dest, stat.IsDir()); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func mountCgroupV1(m *configs.Mount, c *mountConfig) error {
binds, err := getCgroupMounts(m)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var merged []string
for _, b := range binds {
ss := filepath.Base(b.Destination)
if strings.Contains(ss, ",") {
merged = append(merged, ss)
}
}
tmpfs := &configs.Mount{
Source: "tmpfs",
Device: "tmpfs",
Destination: m.Destination,
Flags: defaultMountFlags,
Data: "mode=755",
PropagationFlags: m.PropagationFlags,
}
if err := mountToRootfs(tmpfs, c); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, b := range binds {
if c.cgroupns {
subsystemPath := filepath.Join(c.root, b.Destination)
if err := os.MkdirAll(subsystemPath, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := utils.WithProcfd(c.root, b.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
flags := defaultMountFlags
if m.Flags&unix.MS_RDONLY != 0 {
flags = flags | unix.MS_RDONLY
}
var (
source = "cgroup"
data = filepath.Base(subsystemPath)
)
if data == "systemd" {
data = cgroups.CgroupNamePrefix + data
source = "systemd"
}
return unix.Mount(source, procfd, "cgroup", uintptr(flags), data)
}); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
if err := mountToRootfs(b, c); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
for _, mc := range merged {
for _, ss := range strings.Split(mc, ",") {
// symlink(2) is very dumb, it will just shove the path into
// the link and doesn't do any checks or relative path
// conversion. Also, don't error out if the cgroup already exists.
if err := os.Symlink(mc, filepath.Join(c.root, m.Destination, ss)); err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
func mountCgroupV2(m *configs.Mount, c *mountConfig) error {
dest, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(c.root, m.Destination)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
return utils.WithProcfd(c.root, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
if err := unix.Mount(m.Source, procfd, "cgroup2", uintptr(m.Flags), m.Data); err != nil {
// when we are in UserNS but CgroupNS is not unshared, we cannot mount cgroup2 (#2158)
if err == unix.EPERM || err == unix.EBUSY {
src := fs2.UnifiedMountpoint
if c.cgroupns && c.cgroup2Path != "" {
// Emulate cgroupns by bind-mounting
// the container cgroup path rather than
// the whole /sys/fs/cgroup.
src = c.cgroup2Path
}
err = unix.Mount(src, procfd, "", uintptr(m.Flags)|unix.MS_BIND, "")
if err == unix.ENOENT && c.rootlessCgroups {
err = nil
}
}
return err
}
return nil
})
}
func doTmpfsCopyUp(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string) (Err error) {
// Set up a scratch dir for the tmpfs on the host.
tmpdir, err := prepareTmp("/tmp")
if err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "tmpcopyup: failed to setup tmpdir")
}
defer cleanupTmp(tmpdir)
tmpDir, err := ioutil.TempDir(tmpdir, "runctmpdir")
if err != nil {
return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "tmpcopyup: failed to create tmpdir")
}
defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
// Configure the *host* tmpdir as if it's the container mount. We change
// m.Destination since we are going to mount *on the host*.
oldDest := m.Destination
m.Destination = tmpDir
err = mountPropagate(m, "/", mountLabel)
m.Destination = oldDest
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() {
if Err != nil {
if err := unix.Unmount(tmpDir, unix.MNT_DETACH); err != nil {
logrus.Warnf("tmpcopyup: failed to unmount tmpdir on error: %v", err)
}
}
}()
return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) (Err error) {
// Copy the container data to the host tmpdir. We append "/" to force
// CopyDirectory to resolve the symlink rather than trying to copy the
// symlink itself.
if err := fileutils.CopyDirectory(procfd+"/", tmpDir); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: failed to copy %s to %s (%s): %w", m.Destination, procfd, tmpDir, err)
}
// Now move the mount into the container.
if err := unix.Mount(tmpDir, procfd, "", unix.MS_MOVE, ""); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: failed to move mount %s to %s (%s): %w", tmpDir, procfd, m.Destination, err)
}
return nil
})
}
func mountToRootfs(m *configs.Mount, c *mountConfig) error {
rootfs := c.root
mountLabel := c.label
dest, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(rootfs, m.Destination)
if err != nil {
return err
}
switch m.Device {
case "proc", "sysfs":
// If the destination already exists and is not a directory, we bail
// out This is to avoid mounting through a symlink or similar -- which
// has been a "fun" attack scenario in the past.
// TODO: This won't be necessary once we switch to libpathrs and we can
// stop all of these symlink-exchange attacks.
if fi, err := os.Lstat(dest); err != nil {
if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return err
}
} else if fi.Mode()&os.ModeDir == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("filesystem %q must be mounted on ordinary directory", m.Device)
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
// Selinux kernels do not support labeling of /proc or /sys
return mountPropagate(m, rootfs, "")
case "mqueue":
if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := mountPropagate(m, rootfs, ""); err != nil {
return err
}
return label.SetFileLabel(dest, mountLabel)
case "tmpfs":
stat, err := os.Stat(dest)
if err != nil {
if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if m.Extensions&configs.EXT_COPYUP == configs.EXT_COPYUP {
err = doTmpfsCopyUp(m, rootfs, mountLabel)
} else {
err = mountPropagate(m, rootfs, mountLabel)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
if stat != nil {
if err = os.Chmod(dest, stat.Mode()); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Initially mounted rw in mountPropagate, remount to ro if flag set.
if m.Flags&unix.MS_RDONLY != 0 {
if err := remount(m, rootfs); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
case "bind":
if err := prepareBindMount(m, rootfs); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := mountPropagate(m, rootfs, mountLabel); err != nil {
return err
}
// bind mount won't change mount options, we need remount to make mount options effective.
// first check that we have non-default options required before attempting a remount
if m.Flags&^(unix.MS_REC|unix.MS_REMOUNT|unix.MS_BIND) != 0 {
// only remount if unique mount options are set
if err := remount(m, rootfs); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if m.Relabel != "" {
if err := label.Validate(m.Relabel); err != nil {
return err
}
shared := label.IsShared(m.Relabel)
if err := label.Relabel(m.Source, mountLabel, shared); err != nil {
return err
}
}
case "cgroup":
if cgroups.IsCgroup2UnifiedMode() {
return mountCgroupV2(m, c)
}
return mountCgroupV1(m, c)
default:
if err := checkProcMount(rootfs, dest, m.Source); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
return mountPropagate(m, rootfs, mountLabel)
}
return nil
}
func getCgroupMounts(m *configs.Mount) ([]*configs.Mount, error) {
mounts, err := cgroups.GetCgroupMounts(false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cgroupPaths, err := cgroups.ParseCgroupFile("/proc/self/cgroup")
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var binds []*configs.Mount
for _, mm := range mounts {
dir, err := mm.GetOwnCgroup(cgroupPaths)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
relDir, err := filepath.Rel(mm.Root, dir)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
binds = append(binds, &configs.Mount{
Device: "bind",
Source: filepath.Join(mm.Mountpoint, relDir),
Destination: filepath.Join(m.Destination, filepath.Base(mm.Mountpoint)),
Flags: unix.MS_BIND | unix.MS_REC | m.Flags,
PropagationFlags: m.PropagationFlags,
})
}
return binds, nil
}
// checkProcMount checks to ensure that the mount destination is not over the top of /proc.
// dest is required to be an abs path and have any symlinks resolved before calling this function.
//
// if source is nil, don't stat the filesystem. This is used for restore of a checkpoint.
func checkProcMount(rootfs, dest, source string) error {
const procPath = "/proc"
path, err := filepath.Rel(filepath.Join(rootfs, procPath), dest)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// pass if the mount path is located outside of /proc
if strings.HasPrefix(path, "..") {
return nil
}
if path == "." {
// an empty source is pasted on restore
if source == "" {
return nil
}
// only allow a mount on-top of proc if it's source is "proc"
isproc, err := isProc(source)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// pass if the mount is happening on top of /proc and the source of
// the mount is a proc filesystem
if isproc {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("%q cannot be mounted because it is not of type proc", dest)
}
// Here dest is definitely under /proc. Do not allow those,
// except for a few specific entries emulated by lxcfs.
validProcMounts := []string{
"/proc/cpuinfo",
"/proc/diskstats",
"/proc/meminfo",
"/proc/stat",
"/proc/swaps",
"/proc/uptime",
"/proc/loadavg",
"/proc/slabinfo",
"/proc/net/dev",
}
for _, valid := range validProcMounts {
path, err := filepath.Rel(filepath.Join(rootfs, valid), dest)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if path == "." {
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("%q cannot be mounted because it is inside /proc", dest)
}
func isProc(path string) (bool, error) {
var s unix.Statfs_t
if err := unix.Statfs(path, &s); err != nil {
return false, err
}
return s.Type == unix.PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, nil
}
func setupDevSymlinks(rootfs string) error {
var links = [][2]string{
{"/proc/self/fd", "/dev/fd"},
{"/proc/self/fd/0", "/dev/stdin"},
{"/proc/self/fd/1", "/dev/stdout"},
{"/proc/self/fd/2", "/dev/stderr"},
}
// kcore support can be toggled with CONFIG_PROC_KCORE; only create a symlink
// in /dev if it exists in /proc.
if _, err := os.Stat("/proc/kcore"); err == nil {
links = append(links, [2]string{"/proc/kcore", "/dev/core"})
}
for _, link := range links {
var (
src = link[0]
dst = filepath.Join(rootfs, link[1])
)
if err := os.Symlink(src, dst); err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("symlink %s %s %s", src, dst, err)
}
}
return nil
}
// If stdin, stdout, and/or stderr are pointing to `/dev/null` in the parent's rootfs
// this method will make them point to `/dev/null` in this container's rootfs. This
// needs to be called after we chroot/pivot into the container's rootfs so that any
// symlinks are resolved locally.
func reOpenDevNull() error {
var stat, devNullStat unix.Stat_t
file, err := os.OpenFile("/dev/null", os.O_RDWR, 0)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to open /dev/null - %s", err)
}
defer file.Close()
if err := unix.Fstat(int(file.Fd()), &devNullStat); err != nil {
return err
}
for fd := 0; fd < 3; fd++ {
if err := unix.Fstat(fd, &stat); err != nil {
return err
}
if stat.Rdev == devNullStat.Rdev {
// Close and re-open the fd.
if err := unix.Dup3(int(file.Fd()), fd, 0); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
// Create the device nodes in the container.
func createDevices(config *configs.Config) error {
useBindMount := userns.RunningInUserNS() || config.Namespaces.Contains(configs.NEWUSER)
oldMask := unix.Umask(0000)
for _, node := range config.Devices {
// The /dev/ptmx device is setup by setupPtmx()
if utils.CleanPath(node.Path) == "/dev/ptmx" {
continue
}
// containers running in a user namespace are not allowed to mknod
// devices so we can just bind mount it from the host.
if err := createDeviceNode(config.Rootfs, node, useBindMount); err != nil {
unix.Umask(oldMask)
return err
}
}
unix.Umask(oldMask)
return nil
}
func bindMountDeviceNode(rootfs, dest string, node *devices.Device) error {
f, err := os.Create(dest)
if err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {
return err
}
if f != nil {
f.Close()
}
return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, dest, func(procfd string) error {
return unix.Mount(node.Path, procfd, "bind", unix.MS_BIND, "")
})
}
// Creates the device node in the rootfs of the container.
func createDeviceNode(rootfs string, node *devices.Device, bind bool) error {
if node.Path == "" {
// The node only exists for cgroup reasons, ignore it here.
return nil
}
dest, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(rootfs, node.Path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(dest), 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
if bind {
return bindMountDeviceNode(rootfs, dest, node)
}
if err := mknodDevice(dest, node); err != nil {
if os.IsExist(err) {
return nil
} else if os.IsPermission(err) {
return bindMountDeviceNode(rootfs, dest, node)
}
return err
}
return nil
}
func mknodDevice(dest string, node *devices.Device) error {
fileMode := node.FileMode
switch node.Type {
case devices.BlockDevice:
fileMode |= unix.S_IFBLK
case devices.CharDevice:
fileMode |= unix.S_IFCHR
case devices.FifoDevice:
fileMode |= unix.S_IFIFO
default:
return fmt.Errorf("%c is not a valid device type for device %s", node.Type, node.Path)
}
dev, err := node.Mkdev()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := unix.Mknod(dest, uint32(fileMode), int(dev)); err != nil {
return err
}
return unix.Chown(dest, int(node.Uid), int(node.Gid))
}
// Get the parent mount point of directory passed in as argument. Also return
// optional fields.
func getParentMount(rootfs string) (string, string, error) {
mi, err := mountinfo.GetMounts(mountinfo.ParentsFilter(rootfs))
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
if len(mi) < 1 {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("could not find parent mount of %s", rootfs)
}
// find the longest mount point
var idx, maxlen int
for i := range mi {
if len(mi[i].Mountpoint) > maxlen {
maxlen = len(mi[i].Mountpoint)
idx = i
}
}
return mi[idx].Mountpoint, mi[idx].Optional, nil
}
// Make parent mount private if it was shared
func rootfsParentMountPrivate(rootfs string) error {
sharedMount := false
parentMount, optionalOpts, err := getParentMount(rootfs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
optsSplit := strings.Split(optionalOpts, " ")
for _, opt := range optsSplit {
if strings.HasPrefix(opt, "shared:") {
sharedMount = true
break
}
}
// Make parent mount PRIVATE if it was shared. It is needed for two
// reasons. First of all pivot_root() will fail if parent mount is
// shared. Secondly when we bind mount rootfs it will propagate to
// parent namespace and we don't want that to happen.
if sharedMount {
return unix.Mount("", parentMount, "", unix.MS_PRIVATE, "")
}
return nil
}
func prepareRoot(config *configs.Config) error {
flag := unix.MS_SLAVE | unix.MS_REC
if config.RootPropagation != 0 {
flag = config.RootPropagation
}
if err := unix.Mount("", "/", "", uintptr(flag), ""); err != nil {
return err
}
// Make parent mount private to make sure following bind mount does
// not propagate in other namespaces. Also it will help with kernel
// check pass in pivot_root. (IS_SHARED(new_mnt->mnt_parent))
if err := rootfsParentMountPrivate(config.Rootfs); err != nil {
return err
}
return unix.Mount(config.Rootfs, config.Rootfs, "bind", unix.MS_BIND|unix.MS_REC, "")
}
func setReadonly() error {
flags := uintptr(unix.MS_BIND | unix.MS_REMOUNT | unix.MS_RDONLY)
err := unix.Mount("", "/", "", flags, "")
if err == nil {
return nil
}
var s unix.Statfs_t
if err := unix.Statfs("/", &s); err != nil {
return &os.PathError{Op: "statfs", Path: "/", Err: err}
}
flags |= uintptr(s.Flags)
return unix.Mount("", "/", "", flags, "")
}
func setupPtmx(config *configs.Config) error {
ptmx := filepath.Join(config.Rootfs, "dev/ptmx")
if err := os.Remove(ptmx); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return err
}
if err := os.Symlink("pts/ptmx", ptmx); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("symlink dev ptmx %s", err)
}
return nil
}
// pivotRoot will call pivot_root such that rootfs becomes the new root
// filesystem, and everything else is cleaned up.
func pivotRoot(rootfs string) error {
// While the documentation may claim otherwise, pivot_root(".", ".") is
// actually valid. What this results in is / being the new root but
// /proc/self/cwd being the old root. Since we can play around with the cwd
// with pivot_root this allows us to pivot without creating directories in
// the rootfs. Shout-outs to the LXC developers for giving us this idea.
oldroot, err := unix.Open("/", unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_RDONLY, 0)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer unix.Close(oldroot)
newroot, err := unix.Open(rootfs, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_RDONLY, 0)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer unix.Close(newroot)
// Change to the new root so that the pivot_root actually acts on it.
if err := unix.Fchdir(newroot); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := unix.PivotRoot(".", "."); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("pivot_root %s", err)
}
// Currently our "." is oldroot (according to the current kernel code).
// However, purely for safety, we will fchdir(oldroot) since there isn't
// really any guarantee from the kernel what /proc/self/cwd will be after a
// pivot_root(2).
if err := unix.Fchdir(oldroot); err != nil {
return err
}
// Make oldroot rslave to make sure our unmounts don't propagate to the
// host (and thus bork the machine). We don't use rprivate because this is
// known to cause issues due to races where we still have a reference to a
// mount while a process in the host namespace are trying to operate on
// something they think has no mounts (devicemapper in particular).
if err := unix.Mount("", ".", "", unix.MS_SLAVE|unix.MS_REC, ""); err != nil {
return err
}
// Preform the unmount. MNT_DETACH allows us to unmount /proc/self/cwd.
if err := unix.Unmount(".", unix.MNT_DETACH); err != nil {
return err
}
// Switch back to our shiny new root.
if err := unix.Chdir("/"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("chdir / %s", err)
}
return nil
}
func msMoveRoot(rootfs string) error {
// Before we move the root and chroot we have to mask all "full" sysfs and
// procfs mounts which exist on the host. This is because while the kernel
// has protections against mounting procfs if it has masks, when using
// chroot(2) the *host* procfs mount is still reachable in the mount
// namespace and the kernel permits procfs mounts inside --no-pivot
// containers.
//
// Users shouldn't be using --no-pivot except in exceptional circumstances,
// but to avoid such a trivial security flaw we apply a best-effort
// protection here. The kernel only allows a mount of a pseudo-filesystem
// like procfs or sysfs if there is a *full* mount (the root of the
// filesystem is mounted) without any other locked mount points covering a
// subtree of the mount.
//
// So we try to unmount (or mount tmpfs on top of) any mountpoint which is
// a full mount of either sysfs or procfs (since those are the most
// concerning filesystems to us).
mountinfos, err := mountinfo.GetMounts(func(info *mountinfo.Info) (skip, stop bool) {
// Collect every sysfs and procfs filesystem, except for those which
// are non-full mounts or are inside the rootfs of the container.
if info.Root != "/" ||
(info.FSType != "proc" && info.FSType != "sysfs") ||
strings.HasPrefix(info.Mountpoint, rootfs) {
skip = true
}
return
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, info := range mountinfos {
p := info.Mountpoint
// Be sure umount events are not propagated to the host.
if err := unix.Mount("", p, "", unix.MS_SLAVE|unix.MS_REC, ""); err != nil {
if err == unix.ENOENT {
// If the mountpoint doesn't exist that means that we've
// already blasted away some parent directory of the mountpoint
// and so we don't care about this error.
continue
}
return err
}
if err := unix.Unmount(p, unix.MNT_DETACH); err != nil {
if err != unix.EINVAL && err != unix.EPERM {
return err
} else {
// If we have not privileges for umounting (e.g. rootless), then
// cover the path.
if err := unix.Mount("tmpfs", p, "tmpfs", 0, ""); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
}
// Move the rootfs on top of "/" in our mount namespace.
if err := unix.Mount(rootfs, "/", "", unix.MS_MOVE, ""); err != nil {
return err
}
return chroot()
}
func chroot() error {
if err := unix.Chroot("."); err != nil {
return err
}
return unix.Chdir("/")
}
// createIfNotExists creates a file or a directory only if it does not already exist.
func createIfNotExists(path string, isDir bool) error {
if _, err := os.Stat(path); err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
if isDir {
return os.MkdirAll(path, 0755)
}
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE, 0755)
if err != nil {
return err
}
f.Close()
}
}
return nil
}
// readonlyPath will make a path read only.
func readonlyPath(path string) error {
if err := unix.Mount(path, path, "", unix.MS_BIND|unix.MS_REC, ""); err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil
}
return &os.PathError{Op: "bind-mount", Path: path, Err: err}
}
var s unix.Statfs_t
if err := unix.Statfs(path, &s); err != nil {
return &os.PathError{Op: "statfs", Path: path, Err: err}
}
flags := uintptr(s.Flags) & (unix.MS_NOSUID | unix.MS_NODEV | unix.MS_NOEXEC)
if err := unix.Mount(path, path, "", flags|unix.MS_BIND|unix.MS_REMOUNT|unix.MS_RDONLY, ""); err != nil {
return &os.PathError{Op: "bind-mount-ro", Path: path, Err: err}
}
return nil
}
// remountReadonly will remount an existing mount point and ensure that it is read-only.
func remountReadonly(m *configs.Mount) error {
var (
dest = m.Destination
flags = m.Flags
)
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
// There is a special case in the kernel for
// MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND, which allows us to change only the
// flags even as an unprivileged user (i.e. user namespace)
// assuming we don't drop any security related flags (nodev,
// nosuid, etc.). So, let's use that case so that we can do
// this re-mount without failing in a userns.
flags |= unix.MS_REMOUNT | unix.MS_BIND | unix.MS_RDONLY
if err := unix.Mount("", dest, "", uintptr(flags), ""); err != nil {
switch err {
case unix.EBUSY:
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
continue
default:
return err
}
}
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("unable to mount %s as readonly max retries reached", dest)
}
// maskPath masks the top of the specified path inside a container to avoid
// security issues from processes reading information from non-namespace aware
// mounts ( proc/kcore ).
// For files, maskPath bind mounts /dev/null over the top of the specified path.
// For directories, maskPath mounts read-only tmpfs over the top of the specified path.
func maskPath(path string, mountLabel string) error {
if err := unix.Mount("/dev/null", path, "", unix.MS_BIND, ""); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
if err == unix.ENOTDIR {
return unix.Mount("tmpfs", path, "tmpfs", unix.MS_RDONLY, label.FormatMountLabel("", mountLabel))
}
return err
}
return nil
}
// writeSystemProperty writes the value to a path under /proc/sys as determined from the key.
// For e.g. net.ipv4.ip_forward translated to /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward.
func writeSystemProperty(key, value string) error {
keyPath := strings.Replace(key, ".", "/", -1)
return ioutil.WriteFile(path.Join("/proc/sys", keyPath), []byte(value), 0644)
}
func remount(m *configs.Mount, rootfs string) error {
return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
return unix.Mount(m.Source, procfd, m.Device, uintptr(m.Flags|unix.MS_REMOUNT), "")
})
}
// Do the mount operation followed by additional mounts required to take care
// of propagation flags. This will always be scoped inside the container rootfs.
func mountPropagate(m *configs.Mount, rootfs string, mountLabel string) error {
var (
data = label.FormatMountLabel(m.Data, mountLabel)
flags = m.Flags
)
// Delay mounting the filesystem read-only if we need to do further
// operations on it. We need to set up files in "/dev" and tmpfs mounts may
// need to be chmod-ed after mounting. The mount will be remounted ro later
// in finalizeRootfs() if necessary.
if libcontainerUtils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" || m.Device == "tmpfs" {
flags &= ^unix.MS_RDONLY
}
// Because the destination is inside a container path which might be
// mutating underneath us, we verify that we are actually going to mount
// inside the container with WithProcfd() -- mounting through a procfd
// mounts on the target.
if err := utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
return unix.Mount(m.Source, procfd, m.Device, uintptr(flags), data)
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("mount through procfd: %w", err)
}
// We have to apply mount propagation flags in a separate WithProcfd() call
// because the previous call invalidates the passed procfd -- the mount
// target needs to be re-opened.
if err := utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
for _, pflag := range m.PropagationFlags {
if err := unix.Mount("", procfd, "", uintptr(pflag), ""); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("change mount propagation through procfd: %w", err)
}
return nil
}